A. Technical Field
The present invention relates to secure terminals, and more particularly, to systems, devices, and methods of preventing unauthorized re-use of a secure access module (SAM) in another terminal.
B. Background of the Invention
Commercial secure terminals, such as financial terminals are oftentimes equipped with SAMs, which are secure microchips, e.g., in a SIM format, that have some type of secret information embedded.
Typically, the operator of a terminal that contains valuables controls access to the terminal through the SAM. The SAM is configured to receive and exchange commands sent by the terminal, but does not expose within the terminal the secret information embedded in the SAM. However, a SAM's security is compromised, for example, when it is physically removed from a payment terminal that is vulnerable to attack. The SAM is subject to subsequent counterfeiting and misuse it in an unauthorized terminal.
In order to increase security in certain applications, additional security measures include a requirement that a SAM does not operate in any terminal other than its original terminal. This, in turn, requires that the SAM and the terminal be tightly associated. Existing terminal approaches tie the SAM to the terminal by embedding the SAM in a more or less reliable, physically tamper-resistant compartment within the terminal in order to create a relatively secure enclosure that may be additionally equipped with physical intrusion sensors.
Unfortunately, such designs that rely on a strong physical link for protection against theft increase the complexity involved in the design of the enclosure and unnecessarily raise the cost of production and maintenance (e.g., moisture, shock, false alarms). In addition, each secure terminal manufacturer may require and modify its own standard measures, which creates discrepancies in the level of protection and provide an additional target for potential intruders that seek to exploit the weakest design features. Therefore, such complex and expensive implementations do not lend themselves to mass deployment in high volume markets, such as micro-ATM applications. What is needed are tools for designers of secure systems to overcome the above-described limitations.